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capture	 the	 conditions	 of	 political	 authority.	 Though	 this	 objection	
might	take	many	forms,	one	way	to	put	it	is	that	the	capacity	to	help	





cannot	 establish	 the	 second	 person’s	 authority	 because	 it	 is	 insuffi-
cient	to	ground	either	a	right	to	rule	or	an	obligation	to	obey.	
I	 am	persuaded	 that	both	objections	are	 sound.	Raz	 is	wrong	 to	
think	that	the	role	of	authority	is	to	help	subjects	conform	to	reason,	
and	he	is	wrong	to	think	that	a	claim	to	authority	can	be	justified	by	an	















The	 preemption	 thesis	 tells	 us	what	 an	 authoritative	 order	 does,	
but	it	does	not	tell	us	which	claims	to	authority	are	legitimate	(or,	if	











authority’s	 orders	 than	 by	 deciding	 what	 to	 do	 on	 her	 own.	 There	
are	many	ways	an	authority	might	help	a	subject	conform	to	reason.	
Among	 the	more	 important	 tools	 in	 an	 authority’s	 kit	 are	 expertise,	
freedom	from	bias,	and	an	ability	to	solve	coordination	problems.7 
One	 final	 thesis	 rounds	 out	 the	 service	 conception.	 The	 normal	
justification	thesis	tells	us	that	the	legitimacy	of	an	authority	rests	on	
its	 ability	 to	 help	 subjects	 conform	 better	 to	 reason’s	 requirements	
than	they	otherwise	would.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	an	authority	would	






Razian	Authority”,	Legal Theory	 9	 (2003):	 201–220,	 206,	 I	 have	 substituted	
‘conform’	where	Raz	originally	had	‘comply’.
7.	 These	are	the	first,	second,	and	fifth	entries	on	Raz’s	list	of	“common	reasons	








I. The Service Conception of Authority
























5.	 Joseph	Raz,	Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 






















the	 role	of	 authority	 is	 to	help	 subjects	 conform	 to	 reason.	Political	








mocracy,	 Law	 and	Authority”,	 Journal of Moral Philosophy	 2	 (2005):	 89–99;	
Thomas	Christiano,	“The	Authority	of	Democracy”,	Journal of Political Philoso-
phy	12	(2004):	266–290;	Jeremy	Waldron,	“Authority	for	Officials”,	 in	Rights, 
Culture, and the Law: Themes From the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, 
eds.	Lukas	H.	Meyer	et	al.	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2003),	45–70,	
63–66;	and	Shapiro,	“Authority”,	431–39.	For	a	related	argument,	see	Andrei	
Marmor,	“Authority,	Equality,	and	Democracy”, Ratio Juris	 18	 (2005):	 315–345,	
esp.	317–18,	342–44.	
covered	by	 the	directives.”8	 Taken	 together,	 the	normal	 justification	
thesis	and	the	dependence	thesis	articulate	a	vision	of	the	role	of	au-
thority:	an	authority	considers	 the	reasons	 that	apply	 to	 its	subjects	
and	issues	orders	that	help	them	conform	better	to	those	reasons	than	
they	could	on	their	own.9
















procedures	 expresses	 and	 respects	 our	 “status	 as	 political	 equals”12 
as	well	as	our	shared	 interest	 in	autonomously	controlling	our	own	
8.	 Raz,	Ethics in the Public Domain, 214.	Raz	argues	 for	 the	dependence	 thesis	
independently	of	the	normal	justification	thesis	and	preemption	thesis,	but	I	
find	it	more	natural	to	think	of	it	as	following	from	them.	
9.	 See	Raz,	The Morality of Freedom,	55–56.
10.	 Raz	has	good	company	here.	See,	e. g.,	Richard	Arneson,	“Democracy	is	Not	
Intrinsically	 Just”,	 in	 Justice and Democracy,	 eds.	Keith	Dowding	et	al.	 (Cam-
bridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	40–58.
11.	 Hershovitz,	“Legitimacy,	Democracy,	and	Razian	Authority”,	216–219.
12.	 Amy	 Gutmann	 and	 Dennis	 Thompson,	Democracy and Disagreement	 (Cam-
bridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1996),	18.
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authority’s	 legitimacy	 should	 not	 be	 “judged	 exclusively,	 or	 maybe	
even	primarily,	by	 its	output,	but	rather	by	 its	 input.”23	Moreover,	we	
can	think	that	procedure	matters	without	denying	that	a	democratic	
regime	which	governs	poorly	lacks	legitimacy.	Indeed,	there	are	strong	
reasons	 to	 think	 that	an	adequate	 test	 for	 the	 legitimacy	of	political	
authority	will	take	into	account	matters	of	procedure	and	substance.24
Raz’s	 second	 response	 to	 the	 proceduralist	 objection	 is	more	 in-
triguing.	Its	proponents,	he	says,	“underestimate”	the	service	concep-















































do	not	guarantee	good	government;	 far	 from	 it.	But	we	can	 sustain	
a	 clear-sighted	view	of	 real-world	democracies	without	 abandoning	
the	proceduralist	 thought,	well	put	by	Scott	Shapiro,	 that	a	political	






tion”, Minnesota Law Review	90	(2003):	1003–1044,	1031.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.








































otherwise	would.	On	 this	 understanding	of	 the	normal	 justification	
thesis,	 the	 proceduralist	 objection	 loses	 its	 force.	 If	 people	 are	 obli-




But	 notice	 this:	 Raz’s	 new	 approach	 blunts	 the	 proceduralist	 ob-
jection	only	at	the	expense	of	making	the	normal	justification	thesis	
nearly	empty.	To	decide	whether	the	thesis	is	satisfied,	it	is	no	longer	
enough	 to	 determine	 whether	 compliance	 with	 authoritative	 direc-
tives	will	allow	a	subject	to	conform	better	to	the	reasons	she	has	on 
the matter the directive regards.	We	can	no	longer	decide	whether,	for	ex-
ample,	financial	regulations	are	authoritative	by	asking	if	banks	would	
conform	better	to	what	reason	requires	of	them	in	their	financial	ac-
tivities	 by	 following	 the	 regulations	 than	 by	 governing	 their	 affairs	
on	their	own.	We	must	also	consider,	in	this	case	and	in	every	other,	
whether	a	further	criterion	of	legitimacy	(not	specified	by	the	normal	
justification	 thesis)	gives	 rise	 to	a	duty	 for	 the	subject	 to	comply,	 ir-
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III. Darwall’s Objection













I.	 If	B	would	do	better	 in	 complying	with	 indepen-
dently	 existing	 reasons	were	 B	 to	 treat	A’s	 direc-
tives	as	pre-emptive	reasons,	then	B	has	sufficient	
reason	so	to	treat	A’s	directives.	
II.	 If	B	would	do	better	 in	 complying	with	 indepen-
dently	 existing	 reasons	were	 B	 to	 treat	A’s	 direc-
tives	 as	 pre-emptive	 reasons,	 then	A’s	 directives	
actually	are	such	pre-emptive	reasons	for	B.	
III.	 If	B	would	do	better	 in	 complying	with	 indepen-





















in	 favor	of	 the	dependence	thesis	 loses	 its	 force,	at	 least	as	 to	 them.	
Moreover,	Raz’s	attempt	to	save	the	normal	justification	thesis	hangs	
the	dependence	 thesis	out	 to	dry.	Raz	now	allows	 that	an	authority	
















is	 superfluous,	 as	 the	normal	 justification	 thesis	 is	 never	 satisfied	when	 it	
would	be	triggered.	On	the	independence	condition,	see	Raz,	“The	Problem	
of	Authority:	Revisiting	the	Service	Conception”,	1014–1016.
33.	 Raz,	Ethics in the Public Domain,	214.
























because	it	 is	the	one	the	authority	instructed	people	to	follow.”42	 If	 I	
understand	Raz	correctly,	his	new	view	is	that	the	normal	justification	





40.	Raz’s	 argument	assumes	 that	Darwall	 knows	 that	 the	person	 issuing	direc-
tives	 is	a	financial	expert	and	 that	he	 is	disposed	 to	defer	 to	her	expertise.	













instructions.	But	 if	 [she]	didn’t	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 see	why	
John	would	have	any	standing	to	complain	or	otherwise	
hold	[Sara]	to	account.	Raz	says	that	those	with	practical	
authority	 “have	 the	 right	 to	 replace	 people’s	 own	 judg-
ment	on	the	merits	of	the	case.”	But	what	right	could	John	


















Freedom”, Southern California Law Review	62	(1989):	995–1096.












































normal	 justification	 thesis.	Darwall’s	 objection	poses	 the	 same	 chal-










Raz’s	draft	contains	a	sketch	of	an	argument	 that	aims	 to	do	 just	
that.	Raz	 thinks	 that	 for	a	person	 to	have	a	 right,	 she	must	have	an	
“interest	…	sufficient	to	ground	a	duty	to	protect	or	secure	that	interest	
in	a	 significant	way.”44	Thus,	he	 takes	 the	 task	of	establishing	 that	a	
person	has	a	right	to	rule	to	call	for	showing	that	the	person	has	an	in-
terest	in	a	subject’s	obedience.	What	interest	will	do	the	trick?	As	Raz	
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question-begging	by	saying	that	John	has	an	interest	in	being	a	good	





























came	President.	Presumably,	he	also	 then	had	an	 interest	 in	being	a	good	
President.
56.	Darwall,	“Authority	and	second-personal	reasons	for	acting”,	151.	









there	 is	no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 an	authority’s	 interest	 in	obedience	








Unfortunately,	 I	 do	 not	 think	 we	 are	 in	 best-case–scenario	 terri-
tory	here,	as	Raz’s	response	to	Darwall	has	a	flaw	quite	apart	from	the	




























But	Raz	ultimately	 construes	 the	 right	 to	 rule	 as	 “a	moral	 power	 to	
issue	obligation-	or	duty-imposing	directives”,	not	as	a	claim	on	sub-
jects.59	That	 interpretation	places	 the	Chinese-cooking	example	 in	a	










58.	Raz,	The Morality of Freedom,	26.






J.	Raz,	“Promises	and	Obligations”,	in	Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Hon-





















related	right	 to	 rule	 for	 the	financial	adviser.	Darwall’s	 family	might	











Press,	 1985),	 181	 (discussing	 “the	obligation-out, obligation-in principle”).	 See	
also	Stephen	Darwall,	The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Ac-
countability	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006),	59	and	n.	33.	










































for	Raz,	authority	 involves	 “a	 relationship	between	 reasons	and	per-
sons”,	whereas	 the	 “ordinary	notion	of	authority	…	 is	a	 relationship	













to	 analyzing	 authority,	Raz	does	not	 follow	 through	on	 this	 sugges-













































70.	Darwall,	The Second Person Standpoint,	312.
71.	 I	have	been	influenced	in	this	section	by	Michael	O.	Hardimon,	“Role	Obliga-






much.	 If	 relative	 competency	 established	parental	 authority,	 a	 great	








further,	 and	more	decisive,	 problem	—	Darwall’s	 objection.	A	daugh-





reasons	 to	 promote	 their	 children’s	 wellbeing,	 and	 parental	 author-
ity	helps	them	do	so.	Thus,	we	might	say,	parents	will	do	better	with	
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ability	of	 participating	 in	 a	practice	 that	 structures	 a	 relationship	of	
authority	is	not	by	itself	sufficient	to	ground	an	obligation	to	do	so.	We	
need	to	locate	the	source	of	the	obligation	elsewhere.	
With	 these	 thoughts	 in	mind,	we	can	again	 take	up	 the	question	
whether	and	how	parental	authority	can	be	justified.	I	shall	focus	on	















cupying	 them	age.	 Identifying	 the	 rights	and	duties	associated	with	




process	 as	 akin	 to	 the	one	Ronald	Dworkin	describes	 in	Law’s Empire	 (Ox-
ford:	Hart	Publishing,	1986),	45–86.	If	identifying	the	content	of	roles	is	an	
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is	different	 from	the	case	of	a	parent	who	 inherits	 responsibility	 for	
children	from	a	deceased	sibling.)	One	possibility	is	that	parents	and	
children	 have	 associative	 obligations,	 of	 the	 sort	 described	 by	 Ron-
ald	Dworkin.	That	would	depend	on	whether	 the	 families	 in	which	
they	find	themselves	are	communities	that	show	equal	concern	and	
respect	 for	 their	members.74	Associative	obligations	are	not	 role	ob-
ligations,	as	they	are	premised	on	membership	in	a	social	group,	not	
on	occupancy	of	 a	 role.75	 But	 one	might	have	 an	 associative	obliga-
tion,	 arising	out	of	membership	 in	 a	 community,	 to	participate	 in	 a	















If	we	find	 that	 parents	 and	 children	 are	 obligated	 to	 occupy	 the	
roles	of	parent	and	child,	we	are	close	to	showing	that	parents	have	
authority	over	children,	but	we	are	not	necessarily	there	yet.	We	are	
finished	 if	 the	parent	and	child	 in	question	actually	occupy	 their	 re-
spective	roles.	In	that	case,	the	parent’s	de facto	authority	is	legitimate	
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prepare	the	best	Chinese	meal.	That,	as	we	have	seen,	is	not	enough	
to	establish	 John’s	authority	over	Sara.	But	suppose	 that	 John	 is	 the	












The	 upshot	 of	 the	 last	 example	 is	 that	we	 can	now	 see	 the	 part	
that	consent	plays	in	justifying	authority.	Raz	famously	rejects	consent	
as	a	basis	for	the	authority	of	the	state,	taking	the	view	that	consent	
is	 likely	 to	be	effective	only	 if	 the	normal	 justification	thesis	 is	satis-
fied.79	But	 there	are	many	areas	of	 life	where	we	are	bound	to	obey	
others	because	we	have	signed	up	 to	a	practice	 that	assigns	us	 that	
role.	Consent	is	neither	a	necessary	nor	a	sufficient	condition	for	re-








79.	Raz,	Ethics in the Public Domain,	Ch.	16.




































more	 than	power	 (as	 influence)	 to	 have	de facto	 authority.	He	must	 either	
claim	that	he	has	legitimate	authority	or	be	held	by	others	to	have	legitimate	
authority”	(Raz,	The Authority of Law,	9).
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Thus,	 the	question	whether	 there	are	 legitimate	political	authorities	
depends	both	on	 the	 roles	 involved	 in	political	practice	and	on	 the	







the	same	 thing.	 I	have	said	 that	one	 is	obligated	 to	obey	an	author-






















at	 a	minimum	 required	 to	 love	 and	 support	 their	 children.	 Perhaps	
as	I	prefer,	commitment)	is	often	an	ineliminable	part	of	the	story	of	
why	one	person	is	subject	to	the	authority	of	another.	Moreover,	apart	
from	 the	 state	 and	 family,	most	 roles	 of	 authority	 are	 embedded	 in	





















may	encompass	an	obligation	 to	 fellow	citizens	 to	 follow	the	edicts	
that	 result	 from	democratic	decision	procedures,	without	conferring	
on	anyone	a	right	to	do	the	instructing.	Where	that	is	true,	and	where	



















instance	of	authority	 that	 is	not	attached	 to	a	 role	 in	a	practice.	But	
that	 is	 too	 fast.	As	we	have	seen,	not	every	 instance	 in	which	some-
one	ought	to	do	as	someone	else	instructs	involves	authority.	So	too,	
I	think,	with	our	passenger	who	seizes	control.	Those	she	is	bossing	
























the	 roles	 in	 their	entirety.	A	parent’s	obligation	 to	 love	and	support	









































whether	her	 instructions	are	helpful.	That	 is	not	 the	only	condition;	
otherwise,	people	would	be	subject	to	the	authority	of	intermeddling	
tennis	 coaches.	To	be	 subject	 to	a	 tennis	 coach’s	authority,	 an	adult	
must	have	signed	up	for	the	lessons.	But	if,	having	signed	up,	one	dis-













aim	of	 this	essay	has	been	 to	 shift	our	 focus	 from	roles	 that	author-
ity	 plays	 to	 roles	 that	 people	play	—	which	we	 can	 also	 call	 roles	 of	




















































participants	 in	 the	 2007	Oxford-UCL	Colloquium	 in	 Legal	 Philosophy	 for	
feedback	on	an	early	ancestor	of	this	paper.	
